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Abstract
This paper shows that dynamic ineﬃciency can occur in dynamic general
equilibrium models with fully optimizing, inﬁnitely-lived households even in a
situation with underinvestment. We identify necessary conditions for such a pos-
sibility and illustrate it in a standard R&D-based growth model. Calibrating the
model to the US, we show that a moderate increase in the R&D subsidy indeed
leads to an intertemporal free lunch (i.e., an increase in per capita consumption
at all times). Hence, Milton Friedman’s conjecture There ain’t no such thing as
a free lunch (TANSTAAFL) may not apply.
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01 Introduction
The saying There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch, abbreviated by the acronym
TANSTAAFL and popularized in economics by Milton Friedman (1975), expresses the
insight that every beneﬁt comes at a cost. There is one general exception to this rule.
If resources are being used ineﬃciently, it is possible to get "something for nothing".
In dynamic macroeconomics, such a possibility is referred to as dynamic ineﬃciency.
That is, one may ask if it is possible to implement an allocation of resources such that
per capita consumption increases for some periods and does not decline for any period.
As is well-known, the Solow model exhibits dynamic ineﬃciency if the saving rate
lies above its golden rule level such that capital is overaccumulated (Phelps, 1966).
However, this example is based on a model without optimizing behavior on the side
of households. In an overlapping-generations context, dynamic ineﬃciency may result
since current generations do not take changes in the future interest rate into account
when deciding on their saving rate (e.g. Abel et al., 1989).
This paper shows that dynamic ineﬃciency can also occur in an optimizing agent
framework with inﬁnitely lived households and underinvestment. That is, we start
out with a situation where, from a long run perspective, resources allocated to the
accumulation of (at least) one accumulable production factor are too low in market
equilibrium compared to the social optimum. Note that, for instance, in the Solow-
model in such a situation the economy is always dynamically eﬃcient.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we identify necessary conditions
for the possibility of dynamic ineﬃciency in a situation with underinvestment within
the widely-used class of dynamic general equilibrium models with one consumption
good and fully optimizing, inﬁnitely-lived agents. Second, we employ a calibrated
version of the standard (semi-)endogenous growth model of Jones (1995) to show that
the US economy may indeed be dynamically ineﬃcient. That is, stimulating R&D
investment by raising the R&D subsidy not only raises intertemporal welfare but, at
the ﬁrst glance surprisingly, also enables an increase in per capita consumption at
all times compared to the baseline scenario of no policy change. The reason is that
1households immediately increase their consumption rate due to their expectation of
future productivity advances after the R&D underinvestment problem is tackled. Thus,
the accumulation of physical capital slows down in the initial transition phase to the
new steady state while more resources are devoted to knowledge accumulation. The
decrease in the rate of investment in physical capital then enables an intertemporal
free lunch. Hence, our analysis suggests that TANSTAAFL may not even apply in
advanced economies, due to likely R&D underinvestment. In our calibrated economy,
only for large increases in the subsidy rate, possibly beyond the socially optimal long
run rate, per capita consumption drops initially.
More generally, we identify the following necessary conditions for an intertemporal
free lunch: (i) there is a policy intervention which aﬀects an allocation variable gov-
erning the evolution of the distorted accumulable factor; (ii) the number of allocation
variables exceeds the number of resource constraints by at least two, i.e., there are at
least two degrees of freedom. Within the Jones (1995) model, for instance, an increase
in the R&D subsidy induces a reallocation of labor towards the R&D sector. This
requires a ﬁrst allocation variable to be set freely. For an intertemporal free lunch
to be feasible, i.e. for consumption not to decrease initially, capital accumulation has
to decelerate, which requires a second degree of freedom. This response to the R&D
policy intervention allows for consumption smoothing in the presence of a substantial
positive wealth eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lies out a general, dynamic macroeco-
nomic framework with one consumption good and identiﬁes necessary conditions for
dynamic ineﬃciency. Section 3 calibrates a R&D-based growth model which fulﬁlls
these conditions and shows that the economy is indeed dynamically ineﬃcient. Sec-
tion 4 brieﬂy discusses the possibility of an intertemporal free lunch in various other
widely-used endogenous growth models. The last section concludes.
22 On the Mechanics of an Intertemporal Free Lunch
This section discusses the necessary conditions for an intertemporal free lunch. To be
precise we start with a deﬁnition of an intertemporal free lunch.
Deﬁnition 1. Let cB(t) denote the time path of per capita consumption in the
baseline scenario (i.e. without any policy change) and let cA(t) denote the time path
of per capita consumption in the alternative scenario (i.e. after a policy change).
An intertemporal free lunch is possible (i.e. an economy is dynamically ineﬃcient) if
and only if there is a feasible policy measure such that per capita consumption in the
alternative scenario cA(t) increases relative to per capita consumption in the baseline
scenario cB(t) for some t ≥ 0 and does not decline for any t ≥ 0, i.e. cA(t) > cB(t)
for at least some t and cA(t) ≥ cB(t) for all t.
Notice that we require that an intertemporal free lunch can be realized by a feasible
policy intervention in a market equilibrium.
As it may be trivial to discuss the case where dynamic ineﬃciency occurs in the
case of overaccumulation, we focus on the case where, compared to the social optimum,
the market equilibrium involves underinvestment in (at least) one accumulable produc-
tion factor. The economic logic behind an intertemporal free lunch in this case may
be sketched as follows. Consider a policy intervention which changes the allocation of
resources in the market equilibrium such that the hitherto underaccumulated input fac-
tor gets accumulated in an accelerated fashion. Ceteris paribus, this reduces per capita
consumption at least initially. However, an intertemporal free lunch requires that the
production of consumption goods remains at least constant initially. Thus, in addition
to the allocation variable which causes accelerated accumulation of the distorted factor,
there has to be a second allocation variable which can adjust freely in response to the
policy intervention. An adjustment of this second allocation variable could ensure that
the initial consumption level does not decrease. The requirement excludes cases where
the accumulation of one input factor is a by-product of the accumulation of another
input factor, in the sense that both are driven by the same allocation variable. An
3example for such a case is the Arrow-Romer model (Romer, 1986), discussed in section
4.
To illustrate, consider a dynamic, closed economy framework with a single consump-
tion good, chosen as numeraire. For simplicity, suppose there exists a representative
household, who is fully rational, perfectly informed and acts as living inﬁnitely. The
size of a household, N, grows at constant exponential rate n ≥ 0. His/her preferences






ρ > 0, where c(t) is per capita consumption at time t ∈ R+ and u denotes instantaneous
utility. The size of the representative household equals labor supply to a perfect labor
market (i.e., total employment is equal to N).










i is the input of capital good i ∈ {1,...,I} and LY is labor input into ﬁnal
production. Capital goods are factors which are accumulable by investments, whereas
labor is non-accumulable (but may grow exogenously).2 From a social point of view, the
Y −production technology may exhibit increasing returns to scale. The representative
ﬁnal goods producer privately perceives constant returns to scale. We distinguish
between two classes of dynamic macroeconomic models.
One-sector models. Total supply of accumulable factor i is denoted by Ki. Given
initial level Ki(0), it evolves according to3
˙ Ki = Gi(Y
i) − δiKi, (3)
1The time index is omitted whenever this does not lead to confusion.
2For simplicity, we consider one non-accumulable factor only. Generalization to more than one
non-accumulable factor is straightforward.
3 ˙ Z denotes the derivative of a variable Z with respect to time.
4where function Gi( ) gives us the gross increase of factor i ∈ {1,...,I}, Y i denotes the
amount of ﬁnal output devoted to accumulation of factor i and δi ≥ 0 the depreciation
rate of capital good i. The Gi( ) are increasing functions.
As an example, consider the Solow-model. In this model, gross investment in phys-
ical capital (say, capital good 1) reads G1( ) = Y 1 = sY , where s > 0 is the exogenous
rate of investment out of the ﬁnal good.4 It is well-known that the economy is dy-
namically ineﬃcient if s is above its "golden rule" level, which maximizes per capita
consumption in steady state. By contrast, our goal is to examine the possibility of
dynamic ineﬃciency in general equilibrium, inﬁnite-horizon models with optimizing
agents and underinvestment in the sense that, from a long run perspective, resources
allocated to the accumulation of (at least) one accumulable production factor are too
low from a social planer’s point of view.





i = Y. (4)
Moreover, LY = N and KY
i = Ki for all i (full employment conditions).
Per capita consumption (c) as well as the arguments of functions F and Gi are
called "allocation variables". Let V denote the number of allocation variables and let
R be the number of constraints (restrictions). For the generic one-sector model the
number of allocation variables (c, KY
1 ,...,KY
I , LY, Y 1,...,Y I) is V = 2I + 2, whereas
the number of constraints is R = I + 2 (full employment conditions and (4)). We now
argue that an intertemporal free lunch requires that V −R = I ≥ 2. That is, there are
at least two degrees of freedom in the allocation variables. In the one-sector model,
this is equivalent to the requirement of at least two accumulable factors.
Let q := Nc/Y denote the economy’s consumption rate and denote by si := Y i/Y
the fraction of ﬁnal output devoted to the accumulation of capital good i. We label si
4Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) present an augmented Solow-model with human capital as second
accumulable factor, which evolves analogously to physical capital.
5the "investment rate of factor i". According to (4), we can write





Obviously, if I = 1, raising the only investment rate inevitably lowers the consumption
rate at least initially. Thus, an economy with underinvestment is always dynamically
eﬃcient. However, if I ≥ 2, it could be the case that by raising, say, investment rate
s1, forward-looking agents reduce, say, investment rate s2 such that the consumption
rate q instantaneously rises despite increased accumulation of factor 1.
Multi-sector models. In multi-sector models, the number of accumulable factors
does not necessarily coincide with the degrees of freedom in the allocation variables.
Denote total supply of accumulable factor i by Ki. Given initial level Ki(0), it evolves
according to







i) − δiKi, (6)
where function Gi( ) gives us the gross increase of factor i ∈ {1,...,I}, Ki
j is the amount
of capital good j ∈ {1,...,I} devoted to the accumulation of capital good i, and Li
is the amount of labor devoted to accumulation of factor i. Again, δi ≥ 0 is the
depreciation rate of capital good i. We refer to arguments of the functions Gi( ) as
allocation variables which govern the evolution of an accumulable factor. They are a
subset of all allocation variables (recall that the total set also consists of per capita
consumption and the arguments of production function F). The Gi( ) are increasing
in the allocation variables.














j = Kj for all j ∈ {1,...,I} (8)
Moreover, Nc = Y .
6The number of allocation variables (c, KY
1 ,...,KY
I , LY, L1,..,LI, K1
1,...,KI
I) is V =
2I + 2 + I2, while the number of constraints, (7), (8) and Nc = Y , reads R = I + 2.
There are at least two degrees of freedom in the allocation variables provided that
V − R = I(1 + I) ≥ 2. This is already the case if I ≥ 1. However, in a multi-
sector model with just one accumulable input factor (I = 1), it is diﬃcult to conceive
where an intertemporal free lunch is possible. Both capital and labor input in ﬁnal
goods production have to be reallocated in a way (one increased, the other decreased)
such that the accumulation of a sole capital good is accelerated and the production of
consumption is held at least constant initially.
In the special case where Ki
j = 0 for all i,j ∈ {1,...,I} and labor is used everywhere,
we have V = 2I + 2 and thus V − R = I. Thus, two degrees of freedom means that
there are two accumulable factors, like in the one-sector model. If Li = 0 for all i and
all capital goods are used everywhere, then V = I + 2 + I2 and thus V − R = I2.
Again, V − R ≥ 2 requires I ≥ 2.
Compound models. There may be a mix of both classes of models. In fact, the
Jones (1995) model, discussed in section 3, belongs to this category. Consider a model
with IA+IB = I accumulable factors, where IA ≥ 1 factors are accumulated according
to (3) and IB ≥ 1 are accumulated according to (6). If both labor and all capital goods
enter function F as well as functions Gi, there are V −R = IA +IB(1+IB) degrees of
freedom. In the special case where Ki
j = 0 for all i,j and labor enters everywhere, we
have V − R = IA + IB. If Li = 0 for all i and all capital goods are used everywhere,
then V = I + 2 + I2 and thus V − R = IA + (IB)2. In all cases, IA ≥ 1 and IB ≥ 1,
which holds by assumption, implies V − R ≥ 2. We conclude that an intertemporal
free lunch cannot be a priori ruled out in compound models.
The discussion is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a closed economy with exogenous labor supply and one
consumption good. Suppose that at least one accumulable factor is underaccumulated
from a social point of view. An intertemporal free lunch is possible if the following
necessary conditions simultaneously hold: (i) there is a policy intervention which aﬀects
7an allocation variable governing the evolution of the distorted accumulable factor, (ii)
there are at least two degrees of freedom in the allocation variables.
3 Dynamic Ineﬃciency and R&D-based Growth
This section analyzes the possibility of an intertemporal free lunch in a widely-used
R&D-based growth model with both accumulation of knowledge and physical capital
goods.
3.1 The Jones (1995) Model









with 0 < α < 1, where LY denotes labor employed in ﬁnal output production and
xi the quantity of (physical) capital good i ∈ {1,...,A}. (Time index t is omitted.)
One unit of ﬁnal output can be transformed into one unit of each capital good and all
capital goods depreciate at the same constant rate δ. Thus, we can write the equations
of motion for physical capital goods as5
˙ xi = Y
i − δxi, i ∈ {1,...,A}. (10)
The number of intermediate goods A ("stock of knowledge") is an additional accu-
mulable factor. (The total number of accumulable factors is I = A + 1.) It expands
through horizontal innovations according to
˙ A = ˜ νA
φL
I (11)
with φ < 1, 0 ≤ θ < 1, ˜ ν := ν
￿
LI￿−θ, ν > 0, where LI is labor employed in innovative
5Employing the notation in section 2, replace xi by KY
i in (3) and use that, in equilibrium,
KY
i = Ki = xi.
8activities ("R&D") and ˜ ν is taken as given by the representative R&D ﬁrm. In view
of (3), we have Gi( ) = Y i and δi = δ for accumulable factors i ∈ {1,...,A} and, from
a social point of view, GI( ) = νAφ ￿
LI￿1−θ and δI = 0 in the process of knowledge
accumulation (i.e. knowledge does not depreciate).6
The stock of knowledge A enters as non-rival input into the knowledge accumula-
tion process. Thus, parameter φ measures the extent of an intertemporal knowledge
spillover (which is positive if φ > 0) and labor is the only rival R&D input. An in-
crease in θ means a larger wedge between the privately perceived constant-returns to
R&D and the socially declining marginal product of R&D labor investment (higher
"duplication externality").
Both the market for the ﬁnal good and the labor market are perfect. Also the
R&D sector is perfectly competitive. Physical capital good producers possess market
power but are restricted by a competitive fringe of ﬁrms which do not allow them to
charge a mark-up higher than κ ∈ (1,1/α].7 In equilibrium, all capital good producers
charge the same prices. Thus, xi = x and si = Y i/Y = s for all i ∈ {1,...,A}.
Let us deﬁne the total amount of physical capital as K :=
PA
i=1 xi = Ax. Thus,
aggregate output reads Y = Kα(ALY)1−α. Moreover, summing (10) over all i implies
˙ K = AsY −δK. Thus, the economy’s aggregate investment rate in physical capital can
be written as inv := ( ˙ K + δK)/Y = As. Initially, xi(0) = x0 > 0 for all i ∈ {1,...,A}
and A(0) = A0 > 0 are given.
Let q = Nc/Y , lY = LY/N and lI = LI/N. In the "reduced form", there are four
allocation variables (i.e. q, inv, lY, and lI) and two constraints on these allocation
6Moreover, IA = A and IB = 1, where capital is used only in ﬁnal production.
7In addition to introducing investment subsidies, this is the only way we depart from Jones (1995)
in this section. We introduce the competitive fringe in order to calibrate the mark-up factor according
to empirical estimates.
9variables,8 which may be stated as
l
Y + l
I = 1, (12)
q + inv = 1. (13)
Hence, there are two degrees of freedom in the allocation variables.
The government may subsidize both R&D costs (R&D sector) and capital costs
(x-sector). Subsidies are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax levied on households. Proﬁts are
πi = [pi − (1 − sK)(r + δ)]xi (capital producers) and Π = P A˜ νAφLI − (1 − sA)wLI
(R&D ﬁrms), where pi is the price of xi, r the interest rate, P A the price of blueprints
for new physical capital goods, w the wage rate, sK the subsidy on capital costs, and
sA the subsidy on R&D costs. Accounting for the competitive fringe, the mark up,
charged by capital producers, is such that the equilibrium price is pi = κ(1−sK)(r+δ).9
There is mass one of inﬁnitely-lived households with size N; initially, N(0) = N0 >
0. Household size grows at constant exponential rate n ≥ 0. Preferences are represented
by utility function (1). We employ the standard speciﬁcation of instantaneous utility
u(c) = c1−σ−1
1−σ , with σ > 0.
According to Proposition 1, the economy fulﬁlls the necessary conditions for dy-
namic ineﬃciency. Suppose there indeed is underinvestment in R&D;10 that is, the
socially optimal R&D subsidy rate is positive in the long run. The possibility to real-
ize an intertemporal free lunch by increasing R&D subsidy rate, sA, may exist for the
following reason. On the one hand, an increase in the R&D fraction of labor, lI, lowers
initial per capita income, y(0) := Y (0)/N0. On the other hand, however, it could be
the case that, at the same time, investment rate s of intermediate goods producers
declines as well. In this case, the resulting immediate decrease of inv may suﬃciently
8In the unreduced form, allocation variables are (c, x1,...,xA, LY , LI}, i.e., there are V = A + 3
allocation variables and R = A+1 constraints (ﬁnal goods market clearing condition and (10)). Again,
V − R = 2.
9See Grossmann, Steger and Trimborn (2010a).
10Even in the case where φ = θ = 0, accumulation of A is distorted downwards since innovators
cannot fully appropriate the social gain from an innovation.That is, in equilibrium, the proﬁt of an
intermediate good ﬁrm, πi, is smaller than the social return to an additional intermediate good,
∂Y/∂A.
10raise the initial consumption rate q(0) to induce an increase in initial consumption level
c(0) = q(0)y(0).
3.2 Equilibrium
To save space, we refer to Grossmann, Steger and Trimborn (2010a, Proposition 1)
for the derivation of the equilibrium dynamics and the balanced growth equilibrium.11
Deﬁne k := K/N, pA := P A/N, and let ˜ z := z/N
1−θ
1−φ be the detrended value for any
variable z ∈ {y,k,c,A}. It can be shown that the evolution of the market economy
is governed by the following dynamic system (in addition to appropriate boundary
conditions)
·




− g ˜ A, (14)
˙ p




1−α (1 − lI)











α − ˜ c − (δ + n + g)˜ k, (16)
·
˜ c =
˜ c(r − ρ)
σ
− g˜ c, (17)












−θ = (1 − sA)(1 − α)
 
˜ k
˜ A(1 − lI)
!α
. (19)
The steady state may be characterized by ˙ k/k = ˙ c/c = ˙ A/A =
(1−θ)n
1−φ =: g and
˙ lI/lI = ˙ pA/pA = 0.
We now analyze the model numerically by employing the analytically derived bal-
anced growth equilibrium and the diﬀerential equation system. The numerical simula-
tions rest on calibration of the model to the US. Transitional dynamics are calculated
numerically by applying the relaxation algorithm (Trimborn, Koch and Steger, 2008).
11Grossmann et al. (2010a) derive the dynamically optimal policy mix in the model presented in
this section. They do not analyze the possibility of dynamic ineﬃciency, however.
113.3 Calibration
The observable parameters/ variables largely match the characteristics of the US econ-
omy under the assumption that the US is in steady state.12 We take a per capita long
run output growth rate (g) of 2 percent, a population growth rate (n) of 1 percent,
and a long run interest rate (r) of 7 percent. Given the time preference ρ, parameter σ
is determined by the Keynes-Ramsey rule ˙ c/c = g = (r − ρ)/σ. The depreciation rate
δ can be inferred from US investment rate (inv) and the capital-output ratio (K/Y ).
We use that inv = ( ˙ K + δK)/Y =
￿
˙ K/K + δ
￿
K/Y . In steady state, ˙ K/K = n + g;
thus, inv = (n + g + δ)K/Y . For the US, we observe inv = 0.21 and K/Y = 3,
leading to δ = 0.04. The output elasticity of capital (α) is given by the condition that
the user cost of capital (r + δ) equals the marginal product of capital under optimal
capital investment: α = (r + δ)K/Y . In fact, we assume that the capital subsidy
rate ensures optimal capital investment at all times, sK = 1 − 1/κ (Grossmann et al.,
2010a, Proposition 2). The mark up factor κ is set to an intermediate value of the
empirically plausible range κ ∈ [1.05,1.4] (Norrbin, 1993): κ = 1.2. A higher mark
up factor mitigates the well known "surplus appropriability problem", which gives rise
to R&D underinvestment, but aggravates underinvestment in physical capital. The
R&D underinvestment problem is enhanced the higher is φ (intertemporal spillover)
and mitigated the higher is θ (duplication externality). If θ is close to one, there may be
R&D overinvestment. We assume an intermediate value θ = 0.5. Both φ and θ are not
independent from each other and set to match the economy’s steady state growth rate,
g =
(1−θ)n
1−φ . The current US R&D subsidy rate is just slightly above zero (sA = 0.066).
Table 1 below summarizes our calibration.
As a result of the calibration, the implied R&D intensity is as observed for business
R&D in the US: wLI/Y ≃ 0.02. The optimal R&D subsidy rate which implements
the optimal long run labor allocation is fairly high: sA = 0.88. It reﬂects severe R&D
underinvestment. The sectoral misallocation of labor is the underlying source for the
possibility of an intertemporal free lunch. The optimal rate sA = 0.88 implies a (ﬁrst
12The calibration strategy largely follows Grossmann et al. (2010a).
12best) R&D intensity of about 0.15 in the long run.13
Parameter Value Source
g 0.02 PWT 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006)
n 0.01 PWT 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006)
δ 0.04 implied
r 0.07 Mehra and Prescott (1985)
α 0.33 implied
ρ 0.02 "usual value"
Parameter Value Source
σ 2.5 implied
κ 1.2 Norrbin (1993)
sA 0.066 OECD (2009)
sK 1/6 ﬁrst best value
θ 0.5 intermediate value
φ 0.75 implied
Table 1: Calibration
3.4 The Intertemporal Free Lunch
It is assumed that the economy is in a steady state initially with sA = 0.066. Figure 1
shows the time path of detrended and normalized per capita consumption in response
to an increase to sA = 0.6.14 It illustrates that initial consumption jumps upwards
by about 3 percent instantaneously and is never lower than the initial steady state
value (normalized to unity). Per capita consumption increases drastically by about
370 percent in the long run.
The economic intuition for the possibility of an intertemporal free lunch is as follows.
The increase in sA causes the fraction of labor allocated to R&D, lI = 1−lY, to increase.
Due to the decline in the fraction of labor in manufacturing (lY), per capita output
y drops initially (labor reallocation eﬀect). However, the expansionary R&D policy
attenuates the substantial R&D underinvestment in the market economy. Rational,
13The numerically derived optimal policy mix is quite robust to extensions of the model. Gross-
mann, Steger and Trimborn (2010b) derive similar values for the behaviorally relevant subsidy rates
when accounting for (i) endogenous human capital accumulation, (ii) distortionary income taxation,
(iii) business stealing eﬀects from R&D (following Jones and Williams, 2000), and (iv) transitional
dynamics. Moreover, Grossmann and Steger (2011) show that allowing for heterogeneity of R&D skills
leaves the analytical solution for the optimal long run subsidy mix unaﬀected.
14The employed numerical method by Trimborn et al. (2008), which underlies Fig. 1, does not rely
on linearization around the steady state, which would be inappropriate for the question at hand. The
algorithm is implemented in Mathematica. The underlying ﬁle is available from the authors upon
request.
13forward-looking agents understand that there is an associated wealth eﬀect. They
therefore reduce the fraction of output devoted to the accumulation of physical capital,
i.e. inv decreases. Consequently, the rate of consumption, q = 1 − inv, rises. If the
increase in q(0) is large relative to the decrease in initial per capita income, y(0), per
capita consumption c(0) = q(0)y(0) may jump up initially.
Figure 1: The intertemporal free lunch
Notice that the Jones (1995) model fulﬁlls the conditions of Proposition 1: (i) raising
the R&D subsidy aﬀects the accumulation of knowledge, (ii) there are two degrees of
freedom in the allocation variables. Also the presumption of Proposition 1 holds, as
the optimal long run R&D subsidy is positive.
How does the proportional initial change of consumption (the 3 percent in the ex-
ample considered above) depend on the policy instrument sA? To see this, consider the
initial (i.e. at t = 0) rate of change of detrended per capita consumption, ∆˜ c(0)/˜ c(0),
in response to a change in sA from sA = 0.066 to sA ∈ [0.066 − 0.3,0.066 + 0.85]. By
construction, at initial (US) value sA = 0.066, we have ∆˜ c(0) = 0. Figure 2 (a) shows
∆˜ c(0)/˜ c(0) as function of the R&D subsidy. It shows that ∆˜ c(0)/˜ c(0) is rising in sA
up to sA = 0.72 and is negative for sA−increases slightly beyond the socially optimally
rate, i.e. for sA > 0.89.15
15The range of sA-increases which generate an increase in ˜ c(0) is smaller when the initial R&D
underinvestment problem is less severe. For instance, if the "duplication externality" is parameterized
by θ = 0.75, the steady state R&D intensity at the socially optimal R&D subsidy rate is 7.9 percent
(rather than 15 percent in the case where θ = 0.5). In this case, ˜ c(0) becomes negative for increases
in sA to a level which is considerably smaller than the socially optimal rate (not shown). However,
qualitatively, the insights from Figure 2 remain valid.
14Figure 2: The instantaneous impact of an increase in the R&D subsidy
To further clarify the mechanics of an intertemporal free lunch, let us decompose
the rate of change of detrended per capita consumption by using the deﬁnition of the
















Figure 2 (b) shows the three terms of the right-hand side as function of sA. We
conﬁrm that, for sA > 0.066, the proportional change in the consumption rate q(0)
is positive and increasing in sA, whereas the proportional change in (detrended) per
capita output y(0) is negative and decreasing in sA. When sA is not too high, the
rise in the consumption rate is rather large relative to the drop in per capita output,
15implying ∆˜ c(0) > 0.
4 Dynamic Ineﬃciency and Endogenous Growth
This section brieﬂy discusses whether alternative, widely-used endogenous growth mod-
els satisfy the necessary conditions for dynamic ineﬃciency, as listed in Proposition 1.
4.1 Lab-equipment Approach
Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991) propose a R&D-based growth model which diﬀers
from the set up analyzed in the previous section with respect to the R&D technology.
Horizontal innovations occur according to
˙ A = ηY
I − δIA, (21)
where Y I is the amount of ﬁnal output used for knowledge accumulation. Capturing
the R&D process in this way is sometimes labelled as "lab-equipment approach".16
Labor is used for producing ﬁnal output only, i.e., in equilibrium lY = 1. We can now
distinguish between three income shares to represent the use of income:
q + inv + s
I = 1. (22)
The model fulﬁlls conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1 such that dynamic in-
eﬃciency may occur. For instance, an increase in the capital cost subsidy raises the
aggregate investment rate into physical capital, inv. If, at the same time, the R&D
investment rate, sI = Y I/Y , declines due to a wealth eﬀect similar to the one discussed
above, then the net eﬀect on the initial consumption rate, q(0), may be positive. If it
is, per capita consumption c(0) would increase since per capita output is not aﬀected
instantaneously after a policy intervention. Thus, an intertemporal free lunch may be
16According to the classiﬁcation in section 2, in contrast to the Jones (1995) model, the approach
constitutes a one-sector model. Only ﬁnal output is used in the accumulation processes.
16possible.
4.2 Learning-by-doing
We next consider learning-by-doing externalities à la Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986).









0 < α < 1, A > 0, where productivity measure a :=
￿
KY￿β, β > 0, is taken as given
by the Y −sector and driven by the aggregate capital input, KY. The assumption
captures that ﬁnal goods producers do not take into account that capital investment
raises the economy-wide capital stock and therefore enhances total factor productivity.
This "learning-by-doing" externality distorts accumulation of the only capital good
downwards. With endogenous investment rate s, capital accumulates according to
˙ K = sY −δK, δ > 0. There is no other sector such that, in equilibrium, KY = K and
LY = N (full employment conditions). For instance, if total labor supply N = 1 and
β = 1 − α, the social production function is Y = AK ("AK-model").
The consumption rate reads q = 1−s. Now, addressing the externality by a policy
intervention which raises s leaves per capita output initially unaﬀected but inevitably
lowers q(0). Thus, an intertemporal free lunch is not possible and, by design, the
economy is dynamically eﬃcient. Relating the insight to Proposition 1, note that there
is only one degree of freedom in the allocation variables. That is, V = 4 and R = 3
(full employment conditions and ﬁnal goods market clearing). Thus, condition (ii) of
Proposition 1 is violated.
Whether the model is interpreted to encompass one or two accumulable input fac-
tors would not change the conclusion. One may consider TFP, as given by a := Kβ
(let A = 1), as the second accumulable factor such that ˙ a = βKβ−1 ˙ K. However, this
model version still violates condition (ii) of Proposition 1. It illustrates that the exis-
tence of two degrees of freedom is indeed necessary for an intertemporal free lunch to
be realized, even in the case with two accumulable factors (I = 2).
174.3 Human Capital Externalities
Finally, consider human capital externalities à la Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988). Let
the production technology for ﬁnal output be a function of both physical capital (K)
and human capital (H) such that Y = b
￿
KY￿α (HY)1−α, 0 < α < 1. The per capita
amount of human capital in the economy is denoted by h. There is a human capital
externality which drives total factor productivity, b := hγ, γ > 0. Unlike in the previous
examples, now the accumulation process of human capital uses neither ﬁnal output nor
a non-accumulable factor but human capital itself. The education technology reads





ξ > 0, η > 0, δH ≥ 0, where hH is the per capita level of human capital devoted to
education.17 The associated resource constraint reads
h
H + h
Y = h, (25)
where hY is the per capita level of human capital devoted to ﬁnal goods production.
Physical capital accumulation is standard in its exclusive use of ﬁnal output; we have
˙ K = sY − δKK, δK ≥ 0. Thus, the consumption rate again reads q = 1 − s.
The Lucas-Uzawa model fulﬁlls the necessary conditions for an intertemporal free
lunch mentioned in Proposition 1. There are two accumulable factors, namely K and h.
Moreover, there are ﬁve allocation variables (KY, s, q, hH, hY) and three constraints,
namely KY = K, s + q = 1 and (25), such that there are two degrees of freedom in
the allocation variables. Due to the human capital externality (γ > 0), an education
subsidy, which raises hH, may be justiﬁed. However, this inevitably reduces initial
per capita output y(0), in view of constraint (25). Nonetheless, it may be that, at
the same time, the education subsidy induces a wealth eﬀect which leads to a decline
in investment rate s. Consequently, an instantaneous increase in the consumption
17Lucas (1988) implicitly assumes constant returns in the education technology, η = 1, which allows
for sustained endogenous growth.
18rate, q(0), is possible and may be high enough to raise the initial level of per capita
consumption, c(0) = q(0)y(0).
5 Conclusion
This paper has identiﬁed necessary conditions of dynamic ineﬃciency in the widely-
used class of dynamic, general equilibrium, inﬁnite-horizon models with optimizing
agents even in a situation with long run underinvestment in an accumulable factor.
To the best of our knowledge, the possibility to realize an intertemporal free lunch in
such a framework has not been discussed in the previous literature. Our paper aims
to ﬁll this gap. In order to dynamically evaluate policy interventions, researchers have
to be aware whether they are employing a framework where the possibility of dynamic
ineﬃciency is built-in or not.
We illustrated the possibility of an intertemporal free lunch in a standard, gen-
eral equilibrium model à la Jones (1995) with R&D-based, semi-endogenous, long run
growth and accumulation of physical capital. Interestingly, although the long run
rate of economic growth is not policy-dependent in the analyzed framework, we ﬁnd
that the US economy underinvests in R&D and is dynamically ineﬃcient. That is,
TANSTAAFL does not apply. At the ﬁrst glance, this seems surprising. A priori, one
would suspect that mitigating the R&D underinvestment problem requires to give up
consumption at least in the short run. We showed that this is not the case when the
R&D subsidy rate is raised, due to an immediate slowdown in the process of capital
accumulation.
In sum, our analysis suggests that dynamic ineﬃciency is not a theoretical anom-
aly even in models with fully optimizing, inﬁnitely-lived, forward-looking agents and
positive investment externalities. It is not often that economists can make such strong
policy recommendations than in the case of dynamic ineﬃciency. Thus, future work
should further investigate this fascinating issue in order to help realizing possible in-
tertemporal free lunches.
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